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Abstract—Location privacy has become a growing concern 
impeding the adoption of many Location Based Services (LBS). 
Although there have been several approaches, such as 
anonymisation or obfuscation of location data, none has yet been 
completely successful at addressing privacy protection. This 
paper discusses the results of 256 survey responses which show 
that users’ demands, expectations and concerns vary significantly 
among different user groups (by age, education, income, 
technological experience and social media activity) and infer that 
there is no ‘one fit for all’ solution for different LBS applications 
due to the variation in use. 
Keywords—Location Privacy; Location-Based Services (LBS); 
Demographic Information;  
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Location Based Services (LBSs), such as navigational tools 
and location-aware advertising are services delivering mobile 
data and information where the contextual content to the user 
is tailored to the current or a projected users’ location [1]. 
Personalisation is one of the key features of LBS and is 
welcomed by many users. Knowledge of a user’s location 
enables LBSs to provide more specific services to the 
individual as personal preferences can co-analysed relevant to 
geo-located characteristics. However, personalisation also 
raises concerns regarding users’ privacy particularly when 
including their location. Requiring personal preferences, 
history of activities and more importantly, current location and 
recent trajectories of movements, personalisation could 
disclose rich information to other parties [2]. Location 
awareness alone can reveal a lot about an individual, therefore, 
location privacy is one of the most concerning among wider 
privacy debates for the adoption of LBS applications [3, 4]. 
 In order to access LBSs, mobile users are required to 
disclose their location to the service provider.  This 
information can be subsequently be accessed by the same or 
other sectors without the user’s permission. The availability of 
this data allows users’ activities, preferences, health and 
identity to become characterisable, traceable and in some 
cases uniquely identifiable [5]. One study showed that 87% of 
mobile users can be uniquely identified, including their 
postcode, age and gender, using a collection of non-identity 
attributes [6]. A further study found that only four anonymous 
spatio-temporal points are enough to uniquely identify 95% of 
the crowd [7]. The potential to re-trace users’ identities in this 
way has raised serious concerns due to potential privacy 
violations, positioning it as one of several obstacles to the 
adoption of LBS applications [8].  
Privacy protection relies on the employment of several 
approaches and mechanisms [9]. These can be categorised as: 
(1) Regulatory approaches: the development of rules to govern 
the fair use of personal information and therefore certain 
guarantees of privacy [10]; (2) Privacy policies: trust-based 
mechanisms for prescribing certain uses of location 
information [11]. Their aim is to provide protection that is 
sufficiently flexible to be adapted to the individual user’s 
requirements, situations and transactions [12]; (3) Anonymity: 
the dissociation of user information, including location, from 
an individual’s identity [13]; (4) Obfuscation: the process of 
degrading the quality of information about a person’s location, 
with the aim of protecting user privacy [14, 15]. Each of these 
approaches has its own challenges and limitations and so 
many applications use a combination to protect privacy [16]. 
As one of the four approaches to protect location privacy, i.e. 
(a) regulatory, (b) privacy policies, (c) anonymity and (d) 
obfuscation, the fourth, obfuscation adds uncertainty to the 
location information (position and its accuracy). This 
introduces inaccuracy, vagueness, incompleteness, 
inconsistency, and imprecision in order to lower the 
associations between positional data and reality. Although 
obfuscation can protect the privacy of users in many scenarios, 
it can be viewed as a challenge to the quality of LBS 
responses requested by users, i.e. lowering the quality of the 
position lowers the quality of returned service. This loss of 
quality of service can vary with respect to the type of 
application; for example in pedestrian navigation services, the 
impact of inaccuracy and imprecision on the quality of the 
final service can be significant. While for Location Based 
Social Networking (LBSN), vagueness in input data, i.e. using 
vague/fuzzy spatial concepts such as ‘near’, ‘around’, ‘close 
to’ instead of the actual coordinate, may still provide an 
acceptable level of service. 
The goals of this paper are: (1) to examine the extent to 
which privacy is a concern for users and whether factors such 
as age and education can predict attitudes towards privacy; 
and (2) to establish to what extent users are happy to 
compromise service quality (and therefore optimum 
uncertainty) levels to protect location privacy. Policies and 
regulations would then allow the application to have access to 
a user’s location with a controlled level of accuracy, either 
automatically or manually, assuring a desired level of location 
privacy. Giving the user more options to share/disclose their 
position with different levels of accuracy and continuity may 
attract those who have declined, for privacy concerns, to use 
the LBS applications and services.  
The second section of this paper reviews current privacy 
protection approaches and evaluates their challenges and 
limitations. Various location obfuscation mechanisms are 
examined. Typical scenarios and contexts illustrating when 
such compromises are made are considered. This leads to the 
third section which outlines the hypothesis and research 
questions. Section four describes the methodology and survey 
results which address the research questions. The final section 
dedicated to discussion, conclusion and future work. 
II. LOCATION PRIVACY CONCERNS AND POSSIBLE 
SOLUTIONS 
A. Location Privacy Protection Approaches 
The threats associated with the violation of location privacy 
can dramatically limit the development, adoption and growth 
of LBS applications. LBS require users to disclose their 
locations in order to access more relevant and personalised 
services. LBS providers can potentially store, (mis-/re-) use, 
and even sell location data. Such potential threats to privacy 
can discourage users sharing their location [17]. Additionally, 
a sequence of a user’s locations can potentially disclose 
activities, preferences, health, background, history and many 
other personal aspects. When the sequence of locations is time 
stamped, i.e. knowledge of the movement trajectory, greater 
levels of detail can be revealed [18], with up to a 95% chance 
of uniquely identifying a person with only four spatio-
temporal points [7].  
If these privacy issues are already well understood, the lack 
of awareness regarding location privacy among ordinary LBS 
users may in fact be damaging for LBS providers given the 
potential for users to overestimate the potential threats [17, 
19]. This is partially due to the fact that each application and 
service does not necessarily require the same level of accuracy 
relevant for a service, while positioning solutions are not 
provided with the minimum required level of accuracy. 
Therefore, the access or inference of higher-level private 
information and the potential impact of privacy violation in 
each LBS application differs [20]. Minimum required levels of 
accuracy, continuity and availability of location data for LBS 
application clusters entailing a potential threat to the privacy 
are discussed in [16].  
 Privacy concerns over location awareness have introduced 
major challenges to mobile applications and services, 
including LBSs. Blockage or denial of location sharing, has 
introduced a major challenge to the provision of personalised 
LBSs and the development of the LBS market in general. 
Studies have shown that up to 72% of smartphone owners in 
the US and 68% in Europe change the location settings of their 
smartphones to disable location sharing. More than 95% of the 
time, this is done regardless of the type of application/service, 
some of which can be life-saving/changing. However, recent 
research has found that location privacy concerns could 
depend on the type of application [20].  
There are currently four approaches to location privacy 
protection, of which have their own challenges [8]: 
Regulatory, privacy protection, anonymity and obfuscation. 
The regulatory approach, developed by governmental and 
legislative sectors to define rules to manage privacy have 
faced several challenges. In particular, the numerous ways in 
which they can be interpreted and therefore implemented [15]. 
In addition, due to the time-consuming and complicated 
process of rule and legislation development, the number of 
privacy regulations is relatively small [8]. Regulations on their 
own, cannot guarantee or even prevent the invasion of privacy 
as they are only employed when the privacy violation occurs. 
The regulations and rules can only exist to ensure the 
accountability of governments and subsequent enforcements 
in the case of privacy invasion. Nonetheless, we could imagine 
the development of labels, such as ‘‘in agreement with privacy 
regulation n°’” for LBSs, so that users would be informed 
when installing applications. 
While regulatory approaches target the global or group-based 
safeguards, privacy protection approaches provide more 
flexible and adaptive protection mechanisms to facilitate use 
by individuals [21, 22]. The Internet Engineering Task Force 
(IETF), GeoPrive, the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C)’s 
privacy preferences project (P3P) and Personal Digital Rights 
Management (PDRM) are of the most active bodies in 
developing privacy standards for policies in LBSs. However, 
adoption of these policies has proven to be slow due to the 
nature of LBSs. The fast growing, highly innovative 
ecosystem of LBSs, which follows the trend in new 
technologies, makes it difficult for the policies to be adopted 
to protect the newly encountered situations. This challenge, 
shared by the regulatory approaches, becomes even more 
problematic when the privacy policies need to rely on the 
available regulation to be practically applicable.  
Anonymity provides a mechanism to minimise traceability of 
the information and the individual’s identification with other 
associated data. The anonymity-based approaches, such as k-
Anonymity [23], disassociate the location information from 
the user’s identity or minimise the possibility of inference and 
traceability to the user’s non-identity information (i.e. at least 
k users would satisfy the inferential system, not less). 
Although the k-anonymity approach is technically easy to 
apply and implement, it can be viewed as a barrier to the 
personalisation features of LBS, increasingly popular and 
essential for many applications [24]. A possible solution might 
be pseudonymity-based approaches as they partially allow 
some levels of personalisation. These approaches keep the 
individual’s real identity anonymous while giving a persistent 
pseudonym. Therefore the privacy is protected by using an 
alias, which can be potentially linked with their actual identity 
under higher safeguards. Although pseudonymity could be an 
answer to the problem of personalisation, the sequence of 
pseudonymised locations may lead to the identification of the 
individual if this sequential data is also added to other non-
identical data. Reference [6] showed that 87% of users can be 
uniquely identified using a collection of non-identity 
attributes, including postcode, age and gender. 
The fourth category is obfuscation. Obfuscation lowers the 
positional accuracy of a user’s location to prevent its mis/re-
use [9]. In doing so, obfuscation reduces the possibility of 
associations between positional data and specified real 
information, playing with the existence and boundaries of data 
[8]. 
Although obfuscation can protect the privacy of users in 
many scenarios, it brings a challenge to the quality of LBS 
provision. The quality of service provided by LBS 
applications highly depends on the quality of available 
positional data. This correlation depends on the application 
type. While anonymity hides an individual’s identity and its 
associations with location, obfuscation, which degrades the 
spatial quality of the data, allows the individual’s identity to 
be revealed and be ‘vaguely’ associated spatially. A 
disadvantage of obfuscation therefore, is the potential to match 
other datasets and thus obtain a more accurate location and 
reveal more about the user, to the point of contradicting the 
level of disclosure in the location setup during installation.  
A. Location Obfuscation 
The location of the user is given by an estimate of 
geographical coordinates, a position, and a measure of the 
accuracy of this position. For example, an Android device will 
give a GPS coordinate with a 68% circular error (radius 
corresponding to 1 standard deviation), giving a ‘halo’ or area 
where the user is located. Reference [25] defined obfuscation 
of the location as something that is obtained after a series of 
transformations, either on the position estimate, ‘shifting the 
position’ or on the accuracy measure ‘enlarging artificially the 
accuracy radius’. The obfuscation level can be measured by 
comparing the final accuracy to the best possible option [25, 
26].    
As one of the four approaches to protect location privacy, 
obfuscation adds uncertainty to a users’ location information 
(positional accuracy) by introducing inaccuracy, vagueness, 
incompleteness, inconsistency, and imprecision in order to 
lower the associations between positional data and reality. 
Although obfuscation can protect the privacy of users in many 
scenarios, it can be viewed as a challenge to the quality of 
LBS responses requested by users, i.e. lowering the quality of 
the position lowers the quality of returned service. This loss of 
quality of service can vary with respect to the type of 
application; for example in pedestrian navigation services, the 
impact of inaccuracy and imprecision on the quality of the 
final service can be significant. While for Location Based 
Social Networking (LBSN), vagueness in input data, i.e. using 
vague/fuzzy spatial concepts such as ‘near’, ‘around’, ‘close 
to’ instead of the actual coordinate, may still provide an 
acceptable level of service. 
In this scenario, a novel contribution of the paper is 
represented by a comprehensive solution aimed at preserving 
location privacy of individuals through artificial perturbations 
of location information collected by sensing technology. In 
particular, location information of users is managed by a 
trusted middleware [5,6,9], which enforces users privacy 
through obfuscation-based techniques. 
Key to this work is the concept of relevance as the a-
dimensional metric for the location accuracy. A relevance 
value is always associated with locations and it quantitatively 
characterizes the degree of privacy artificially introduced into 
a location measurement. Based on relevance, it is possible to 
strike a balance between the need of service providers, 
requiring a certain level of location accuracy, and the need of 
users, asking to minimize the disclosure of personal location 
information. Both needs can be expressed as relevances and 
either quality of online services or location privacy can be 
adjusted, negotiated or specified as contractual terms.  
III. SURVEY AND RESPONSES  
The survey focused on the levels of different aspects of 
spatial uncertainty, including inaccuracy, vagueness, 
incompleteness, inconsistency, and imprecision [s] required to 
provide acceptable levels of service quality whilst preserving 
the privacy of users for navigation services (as the largest 
revenue generator segment of LBS). The aim is to identify the 
optimum framework for modelling spatial uncertainty for the 
purpose of obfuscation of location data in location privacy 
protection. The research questions concern the trade-off 
between the desired quality of service expected and levels of 
privacy protection derived from the levels of obfuscation.  
A first set of questions aimed to assess the views and 
perceptions of users’ location privacy. These were then 
correlated with users’ profile data relating to age, gender, 
educational attainment and activity profiles (social media and 
navigational services activity).  
A. Survey Structure and Participants Demographics 
In February 2017 a survey was conducted to explore the 
extent to which user’s were prepared to compromise location 
privacy for quality of LBS. A sample of 239 SurveyMonkey 
participants were surveyed. Participants were represented by 
an approximate female to male ratio of 2:1 (60.7% female, 
38.5% male and 2.38% other). With regard to age, 15% of 
respondents were below 30, 83% 20 or over, 56.5% 50 and 
over, thereby representing mainly the views of this age cohort. 
With regard to educational attainment, 35.5% did not hold a 
first degree, whilst 38% had a first degree and 26.5% a 
postgraduate qualification (Masters or PhD). This suggests a 
reasonably even representation of education levels.  
B. Survey Results 
Privacy concerns. The research aimed to assess the extent to 
which users were prepared to compromise their location 
privacy for an improved quality (accuracy) of LBS (knowing 
that the quality of the output service could be compromised if 
they increased the levels of location privacy). The research 
hypothesised that given the choice users are more likely to 
choose not to degrade the quality of positioning. 
Respondents indicated if and why they change the location 
settings of their mobile devices due to privacy concerns. 
Participants were offered 5 different responses or the option to 
provide their own reason. These options included “They can 
track me (even if I am not using a navigation service)”, “My 
data can be given to individuals without my permission”, “My 
data can be sold to a third party without my permission”, “My 
data can be reused by the same service provider for other 
purposes (such as advertisement)”, and “The apps/services I 
use do not seem to need my location”. Respondents were 
asked to provide the significance of their decisions based on a 
5-point scale, ranging from “very important” to “completely 
irrelevant”. Reliability of the three items was high, α = 0.84, 
0.83, and 0.88 for navigation services, Location-Based Social 
Media, and Advertisement and deals, respectively. On 
aggregate 49% of respondents were prepared to trade-off 
location privacy in order to retain LBS quality, in terms of 
individual trajectories and traceability. However, 15% of 
respondents were willing to trade-off quality of service for 
location privacy in terms of traceability. When the prospect of 
data sharing (between third parties/re-used by the provider) 
was introduced, the extent to which users were prepared to 
trade-off location privacy for service quality was reduced to 
around 30%, with on average 30% of users prepared to 
compromise service quality completely for location privacy 
protection. 
Location obfuscation. Users’ privacy concerns were 
supported by more specific questions regarding location 
obfuscation. Participants were asked for which scenarios they 
would be prepared to degrade their location data that was 
disclosed to an app/service provider in order to protect 
location privacy. In this part of the survey the participants 
were briefed that some quality aspects of the final service, 
such as availability or accuracy of the navigational 
instructions or frequency of traffic data updates, would be 
compromised. Based on several scenarios respondents were 
then asked to select what level they would like to degrade their 
input position knowing the output navigation service would be 
less reliable or accurate, by selecting how likely they would be 
to select this scenario. Respondents had three options of “very 
likely”, “maybe”, and “very unlikely”. Then they were asked 
to state the optimum balance, from their point of view, for the 
proposed scenarios.  
Overall, 46% of respondents said they were “very likely” to 
disclose their location information for the best quality of 
service for journey planning, i.e. not obfuscate their location 
data at all. While 17% of respondents responded that they 
would be “very unlikely” to do this. When presented with the 
option to obfuscate their location to within 1km accuracy and 
receive service updates every minutes (the highest degree of 
obfuscation/lowest quality option given) these figures were 
almost revered, with 47% of respondents stating that they 
were “very unlikely” to do this and 21% stating that they 
would be “likely” to opt for this scenario. The most acceptable 
levels of obfuscation sat somewhere between 100-200m 
locational accuracy for accurate service updates every 2-3 
minutes, with 72 of participants responding with “very likely” 
or “maybe” to these two scenarios. 
When asked whether respondents would be willing to share 
their location whilst not using a navigational LBS, over 83% 
stated that they would either be unwilling to do this (61.3%) or 
would want the option to interrupt this feature if required 
(22%). Thereby suggesting data sharing with no advantages 
(i.e. service provision) is overwhelmingly unacceptable to 
users.   
Privacy concerns and user profile interactions.  The second 
part of the research aimed to look at whether there is an 
interaction with age, education and activity levels on social 
media or use of navigation apps? Frequent navigation 
service/app users show more likelihood of sharing: 
Some results on this are required here: 
IV. DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
With the growth of social media as a platform to share 
photos, feelings, plans and news (particularly among the 
younger generation) a reasonable assumption was made that, 
due to frequency of posting, active users of social media are 
less concerned about general privacy. Therefore, for active 
social media users, the research attempted to ascertain the 
correlation between degrees of privacy concerns and levels of 
activity. Extreme views on location privacy, i.e. no concern at 
all and no disclosure could be linked to various factors 
including educational attainment or technological knowledge. 
Some studies (references) support the hypothesis that lack of 
education and/or technological awareness (often highly 
correlated with age) are associated with ignorance regarding 
privacy and risks associated with disclosed location. However, 
it has also been found that there is an exaggeration or 
overestimation in the threats of disclosing user related data 
(references). For location data and associated privacy 
concerns, this could be different as location and movement 
data can tell a lot about an individual and so the potential 
threats might be higher, or less appreciated or simply ignored 
due to a lack of education or lower age. So an important 
question is about the relations between age, education level 
and the location privacy concerns expressed.  
A Correspondence Analysis of the contingency table 
crossing the Research questions (Q8-Q13) and descriptors of 
the profiles of the respondents has been performed (see 
Leibovici DG, and Birkin MH (2013) Simple, multiple and 
multiway correspondence analysis applied to spatial census-
based population microsimulation studies using R. This 
multidimensional analysis act as a dimension reduction like 
PCA (Principal Component Analysis) but also offers a break-
down decomposition of the distance to independence 
measured by the chi-square statistic on this contingency table 
(generalising a chi-square measure between two categorical 
variables), so describing the lack of independence between the 
answers to Q8-Q13 and the characteristics of the respondents: 
socio-demographic descriptors and attitudes towards using 
social media and navigation apps. Associations within the 
categories of these descriptors used (e.g. male and oldest) with 
questions responses (e.g. would not disclose location for better 
service (from Q11) and high privacy concerns because of 
tracking (fromQ8)) are depicted from the pairs of components 
associating the rows and columns for each dimension 
captured. The analysis of the 26 x 80 table (see variables 
involved in the results) explain for the three best dimensions 
29%, 16% and 11% of the lack of independence, so capturing 
non-expected associations under the hypothesis of 
independence.  
To facilitate the interpretations and reading the associations 
between rows and columns, each dimension has been 
summarised in  Figure 1. The coordinates on the components 
are ordered from positive to negative values. The ctr and cos2 
statistics are used to retain what is significant in giving a 
meaning to the captured dimension, i.e. looking for 
associations (same side of the dimension), or oppositions 
(opposite sides of the dimensions). The ctr (standardised to 
1000) expresses how the variables contribute to the dimension 
inertia, e.g. the 29% of the total inertia that is captured by 
dimension dim1. So, across the rows or across the columns the 
sum of the ctrs are 1000 and for example 148/1000 or 14.8% 
of these 29% are due to ‘0.Navapp’ answers (not using any 
navigational app). The ctr values have to be compared to the 
average ctr, for example the column variable 
‘Q12.TradeOff.Scen.200.coar.likely‘ contributes to 44 out of 
1000 of the semantic of the component which is nearly 4 times 
the average contribution of 12.5 out of 1000 (as 
1000/80=12.5). In each table only column  variables that have 
a ctr greater  than 12.5 are displayed. For the rows 
‘monthly.Nav ‘ is contributing to 89 out of 1000 on the 
negative side of the axe; the average contribution is 
1000/26=38.5, but we displayed all rows in the figures. The 
Cos2 expresses how well, in a regression sense, the variable is 
explained by the dimension (as projected on this dimension); 
therefore, the sum of the Cos2s across the dimensions equal 
1000. It can be interpreted as an R2. Therefore, for a variable 
(row or column) to be able to bring its semantic into a 
dimension needs to contribute enough (ctr) and to be relatively 
well explained by this dimension as well. The number of stars 
put in the figures 1-3 are highlighting the variables useful to 
interpret the dimensions and so associations and oppositions 
within rows or columns and between them. 
Active social media users (active on two or more 
applications) or those using a navigation service on a daily 
basis, who are less than 30 years old and sometimes change 
their location settings, are in opposition to non-active users of 
social media or navigation service or having no specific 
navigational service who are more likely to be older (over 50 
year old) and regularly changing the location setting. The 
results show that gender and educational attainment do not 
play a significant role for dimension 1 (low ctrs) . This user 
profile is associated with the column component of dimension 
1: ‘likely’ vs ‘unlikely’ concerning various tradeoffs between 
better service levels (Q10 and Q12) as well as an opposition to 
privacy concerns  (Q8) linked also to disclosure control (Q11). 
Notice that the (young) frequent users of social media and 
navigation are at the same time considering the privacy 
concerns seriously (Q8 Important but Ok for No permission) 
and are likely to will to control the way the location and 
accuracy of service delivered but the rare users more likely 
older are not willing to compromise or disclose their location 




In Figure 2, opposition between young female  social media 
users changing their location settings (always or sometimes), 
and, male navigational app users ( 2 apps) who rarely or never 
change change the location settings with a tendency to be 
older and more educated (but ctr below average). The female 
profile is associated with willing to disclose location (Q11, 
Q13, Q12, Q9) but all with a very coarse resolution 
(accuracy). They also have a high concern about privacy to the 
point of not using the service in a tracking situation (Q8) as 
well as for the other situations in a lesser extent (here they 
have all above average ctr). This is opposed to Q8 privacy 
concerns situations judged as ‘low impact but ok’ or ‘not 
concerned’ (tracking) and share all the time the location (Q9) 
for the different Q9 tradeoff scenarios. 
In Figure 3, the row variables component opposes 
navigational users who rarely change their location settings 
but who do not use social media apps and have a school level 
of achievement less than a degree, to users with a degree using 
on weekly basis a navigational app as well as social media and 
never change their location settings. The latter profile is in 
association with the column variables component highlighting 
a ‘maybe’ attitude on tradeoff between location disclosure and 
service accuracy (Q12) but who considering privacy is 
important nonetheless accepting to disclose it. For the former 
profile not using social media they prepared to disclose if 
promotions (Q11) or do not feel concerned or want best 
service (Q13) but in the meantime point out to ‘likely’ for Q10 
with quite coarse resolution (up to 10mn). 
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